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ABSTRACT 
Carrying capabilities of drones and their easy accessibility to the public have led to an increase in 
crimes committed using drones in recent years. For this reason, the need for forensic analysis of 
drones captured from the crime scenes and the devices used for these drones is also paramount. 
This paper presents the extraction and identification of important artefacts from the recorded 
flight data as well as the associated mobile devices using open source tools and some basic scripts 
developed to aid the analysis of two popular drone systems- the DJI Phantom 3 Professional and 
Parrot AR. Drone 2.0. Although different drones vary in their operations, this paper extends the 
extraction and analysis of the data from the drones and associated devices using some generic 
methods which are forensically sound adhering to the guidelines of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO). 
Keywords: Digital forensics, Drone forensics, Open source tools, DJI Phantom, AR Drone 2.0. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Drones, also known as unmanned aerial 
vehicles (U AV) , are being increasingly popular 
amongst public due to their accessibility and 
affordability. This popularity is not only 
helping in rapid growth of global commercial 
market of UAVs (Majendie & Chia, 2018; 
Moskwa, 2016) but also inevitably increasing 
drone crimes (Yeung, 2016). The carrying 
capabilities of drones over long distances 
(UAV, 2018) and their remote operation make 
drones ideal for transport of contraband, also 
known as smuggling (BBC, 2016; Yeung, 
2016) , the most widely committed drone crime. 
This type of drone crime has become prolific in 
the UK and around the world (Dinan, 2017; 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
Mikelionis, 2018), such as dropping weapons, 
phones, drugs into prisons or delivering drugs 
or sometimes arms in and out of a country 
bypassing borders. As well as smuggling, the 
camera mounted onto a drone, either as a 
static recording or a live streaming device, 
raises significant data privacy concerns for 
organisations and public. Also, the ability of 
drones capturing pictures or videos of 
operations in designated no-fly-zone areas of 
airspace (CAA, 2015), such as, airports, 
military base and power stations, presents a 
significant security threat. Drone-mounted 
cameras are also being used for traditional 
crime such as burglary (Barrett, 2015; 
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Siddique, 2017). Furthermore, drones are being 
utilised as deadly weapons m countries 
involved in conflict. Mostly hovering-type 
drones such as the DJI Phantom or similar, are 
used in these type of attacks (Rambling, 2017; 
Waters, 2017). 
Due to the rise in criminal activities, the 
need for forensic analysis of the captured 
drones has augmented immensely. After 
capturing the drone, a forensic analysis can 
provide a lot of information about the 
potential suspect of a crime based on the data 
gathered from on-board sensors and other 
electronics that assist with flight and 
navigation, as well as the camera and digital 
storage. This can also help in preventing 
further crime. Interpreting the flight data and 
tackling the multi-platform nature of drones 
are the major challenges in forensic analysis of 
drones. This paper presents the extraction and 
interpretation of important artefacts found in 
the recorded flight logs on both the internal 
memory of the U AV and the controlling 
application, as well as analysis of media logs 
and other important files for identifying 
artefacts with the use of open source tools as 
they are flexible and meet guidelines on the 
admissibility of evidence (Carrier, 2002). 
Additionally, some basic scripts will be used to 
aid the forensic analysis of two commercially 
popular drone systems, demonstrating the 
potential for developing more robust forensic 
tools applicable to other platforms. The chosen 
drones for analysis are -the DJI Phantom 3 
Professional (DJI, 2018) and Parrot AR. Drone 
2.0 Power Edition (Parrot, 2017), for ease of 
subsequent reference the drones are designated 
as DJI and A.R respectively throughout the 
paper. The DJI is a quadcopter drone with a 
variety of features and capabilities and 
dominating with 70% and Parrot A.R is in 
second with 7% of market share among 
commercially available drones (Valentak, 
2017). These drones are different in their 
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operation and their capabilities and some 
generic methods reported in (Barton & Azhar, 
2018) will be applied in this paper for the 
analysis and comparison of results between 
the two drone models. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the existing research 
in relation to forensic analysis of drones, 
Section 3 discusses the methodology used to 
analyse the drones and accompanying mobile 
platform. In Section 4 results of the analysis 
are reported and finally Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A forensic analysis of U AV system using 
Parrot Bebop UAV is reported in (Horsman, 
2016). The author highlighted some key areas 
of analysis including acquisition of data, 
establishing flight data and the ownership, 
these pose a variety of challenges to the digital 
forensic investigators. Firstly, the presence of 
identifying artefacts such as name and address 
is not essential for drone operation, it is 
possible to operate a drone with little or no 
identifying artefacts left on it. Which is in 
complete contrast to forensic investigation 
involving mobile devices where an abundance 
of personal information is available in the 
devices. Secondly, to re-create the actions 
taken by the drone, interpretation of the 
recorded flight data is essential, which is not a 
likely skillset of forensic investigator. At a 
minimum, the understanding of timestamped 
latitude, longitude and altitude measurements 
is required, as well as speed, battery level and 
other data from a host of possible on-board 
sensors. 
Modern drone systems are comprised of a 
number of hardware platforms, which makes 
drones a valuable source of forensic artefacts, 
creating the need for forensic research into the 
area. Some of these component platforms 
contain physically identifiable artefacts such as 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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serial numbers printed on the casing, which 
can later be matched up to artefacts recovered 
using digital forensics (Kovar, Dominguez, & 
Murphy, 2015). Another work (Maarse, 
Sangers, Ginkel, & Pouw, 2016) presented a 
forensic analysis of DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ , 
where flight data related artefacts were 
successfully recovered from various components 
of the UAV, including the controller, mobile 
application and the U AV itself. . The recorded 
media of the Phantom 2 Vision+ was found to 
possess Exchangeable Image Format (EXIF) 
metadata including GPS ( Global Positioning 
System) information. In the absence of flight 
logs, for example if the images were copied to a 
separate storage media or the U AV was 
damaged in some way, co-ordinates extracted 
from EXIF data can be used to recreate a 
flight. 
An analysis of the DJI Phantom 3 
Standard edition (Trujano, Chan, Beams, & 
Rivera, 2016) revealed that an IPv4 network is 
created between the components of the U AV 
system including the drone, controller, on-
board camera and mobile devices. The 
controller relays commands to the drone via 
radio signal. The smartphone running the DJI 
GO application connects to the controller via 
Wi-Fi or by USB connection, which provides 
access to the network. De-compilation of the 
DJI GO application revealed the Service Set 
Identifier (SSID) and password required to 
gain access to this network. The authors also 
discussed (Trujano et al., 2016) several 
security issues related to DJI Phantom 3 
Standard edition. 
A detailed security analysis of the DJI 
Phantom 3 Advanced edition is presented in 
(Luo, 2016). The author identified various 
security issues and their countermeasures by 
several analyses including firmware analysis, 
GPS analysis, radio signal analysis and 
Software Development Kit (SDK) 
authentication. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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The work reported in (Jain, Rogers, & 
Matson, 2017) analysed the basic structure of 
five commercially available drones and 
proposed some steps, that would aid the digital 
investigation of drones. Some of the steps 
include, risk assessment , collection of data 
from the crime scene, identification of drone 
category, weight, fingerprint available on the 
drone, data signal in Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, 
memory card, and lastly, documentation of 
every steps. 
Another article (Pleban, Band, & 
Creutzburg, 2014) analysed the security 
threats on A.R Drone 2.0, for example, attack 
through the Telnet or FTP server or through 
Wi-Fi by de-authenticating the real user and 
proposed encryption to secure the drone. A.R 
drones use an embedded Linux operating 
system that governs the flight , camera and 
network interfaces. The drone provides an 
unsecured (by default) wireless access point. 
Once connected, root access to the operating 
system is granted via an anonymous telnet 
port. Root access presents a number of options 
for acquisition, including imaging internal 
storage partitions and logical-level copying 
(Horsman, 2016). 
In a recent work (Barton & Azhar, 2018) 
utilised open source tools for forensic analysis 
of a multi-platform UAV system. Unlike 
commercial toolkits, open source and custom 
forensics tools have the ability to be tested by 
the open source community, meeting what are 
known as the "daubert" guidelines for the 
admissibility of evidence provided by expert 
witnesses (Carrier, 2002). The freedom of using 
open source tools is another advantage over 
the costly commercial (Zanero & Huebner, 
2010). Furthermore, successful custom tools 
created for one specific case, can be adapted in 
other cases involving similar technology. 
However, the support available in the form of 
updates, bug reporting and additional 
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documentation is an advantage of commercial 
toolkits. 
Most of the studies reported above focused 
on the extraction of automated flight plans 
and analysis of media utilising methods 
applicable to specific models of drones. The 
investigation presented in this paper will focus 
on the extraction and interpretation of wider 
range of important artefacts found both on the 
internal memory of the drones and the 
controlling application with the use of open 
source tools and some generic methods that 
can be applied to both the DJI Phantom 3 
Professional and the A.R. Drone 2.0 Power 
edition, as well as testing anti-forensics 
measures. 
3. JVIETHODOLOGY 
The study reported in this paper focusses on 
two drones and the accompanying mobile 
platform - a Motorola Moto G 3rd Generation 
' 
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Android is chosen 
as the mobile platform because of its 
dominance in mobile market (Gartner, 2018) 
Table 1. 
Drones 
Name 
Price 
DJI Phantom 3 £699.99 Professional 
A.R Drone 2.0 £299.99 
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Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools 
and its huge online developer community, 
which comes from its open source status. Prior 
to analysis, a custom community built based 
on universal open-source Android software 
' CyanogenMod ( CyanogenMod, 2017), was 
installed on the platform. CyanogenMod 
includes forensically sound rooting feature 
which does not require further modification 
and is tested to the same standards as stock 
operating systems (Karlsson & Glisson, 2014). 
The scenario creation was performed before 
rooting took place. Alongside the Motorola 
Moto G 3rd Generation, a Samsung Galaxy S4 
Mini running a stock Android 4.4.4 operating 
system as a second platform, rooted using 
Kingo Root (KingoApp, 2017), was tested to 
ensure consistency between results , with the 
same version of the DJI GO application 
installed. No noticeable difference was found in 
the data structures created by both 
applications on the internal storage media of 
the platforms. 
Specifications 
Camera Range Weight 
Resolution 
4K (12 5Km 1280g Mega pixels) 
380g / 720p (0.9 50m 
420g Mega pixels) 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
 Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools JDFSL V13Nl 
Table 2. 
Mobile Platforms 
Name Model Android 
Number Version 
Motorola Moto G Moto G3 5.1.l(Lollipop 
3rd Generation ) 
Samsung Galaxy GT-I9195I 4.4.4 (KitKat) 
S4 Mini 
A scenario was created using the devices by 
simulating the use of the drones in a crime, to 
generate the required data for acquisition and 
analysis as this is a necessary and established 
part of forensic research ( Azhar & Barton, 
2016). Because of potential privacy and safety 
concerns of using drones, as mentioned earlier, 
selection of the location and tests of the 
devices were conducted following legal 
guidelines on drone safety (CAA, 2015) . A 
suitable remote area with tall building 
structures and open space was chosen to test 
the capabilities of the drones. Four waypoints 
over about a 150m radius were established to 
test both the manual and automatic function 
of the drones. 
An artefact-driven analysis was performed 
on the UAVs and the mobile platforms and 
were divided into three categories. The first of 
these is identification of suspects. In this case, 
a suspect is most likely to be the user of the 
drone, and therefore the main area of interest 
in identification is the method of control, 
especially via smartphone. Each drone included 
in this project uses a slightly different method 
of control, all with smartphones. The DJI 
Phantom, for example, uses a physical 
controller in conjunction with commands from 
the smartphone, transmitted to the drone 
(DJI, 2018) whereas the A.R Drone 2.0 uses 
direct connection from the smartphone to the 
drone via Wi-Fi and Bluetooth respectively. 
Each of these methods will leave a different 
footprint on the drone and identifying artefacts 
such as MAC (Media Access Control) address 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
CyanogenMod Kernel Version Installed 
Version Application 
12.1 (Osprey) 3.10.49- DJI GO v3.1.4 
g55f6ac8 
N/ A 3.10.28-5334500 DJI GO v3. l .4 
and phone model, operating system etc. will be 
crucial m reducing a suspect pool in 
investigations. 
Another category of artefacts related to 
drones is the interpretation of the flight data. 
These were collected via various sensors 
present on the UAV systems. Some key data of 
interest were GPS readings, battery levels, 
altitude, acceleration, speed. Analyses of these 
data can reveal the actions of the drone during 
flight . For example, GPS co-ordinate can 
reveal from where the drone took off, or in the 
event of a crash, battery levels can reveal the 
time when the drone failed as it can be 
correlated with time. These data can also be 
used to re-construct the flight, which is 
especially important when the drone has been 
used in smuggling or other flight-related crime. 
The category of artefacts related to drones 
is the extraction of artefacts from recorded 
media which includes any photos or videos 
taken by the device's camera. All of the drones 
are fitted with at least one camera which is 
controllable through the smart phone 
application or controller. The use of drones as 
bombers by ISIS was all recorded via the 
drone's on-board camera in order to produce 
videos (Waters, 2017), and the capture and 
analysis of such a bombing drone would be 
able to reveal actual and potential targets and 
measures such as evacuation can take place. 
The DJI is equipped with a high-end camera 
capable of high resolution photos and videos, 
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while the A.R is equipped with two fixed lower 
resolution cameras. 
Because of the acquisition and the analysis 
of the artefacts performed on multi-platforms, 
including the UAV systems, mobile devices, 
and removable storage, a variety of file systems 
and interfaces were encountered. Development 
Table 3. 
Forensic uti ities. 
Computer used Operating 
system 
Toshiba Satellite Kali 
L450D Linux 
Rolling 
Update 
3 .1 Mobile Forensics 
Mobile forensics were performed to analyse the 
data of the DJI GO (DJI, 2018)and A.R 
Freeflight (Parrot, 2017) applications, which 
were installed via the Android app store. As 
mentioned in Section 3, a Motorola Moto G 
3rd Generation running a customised version 
of Android, CyanogenMod (CM) version 12.1 
( CyanogenMod, 2017), was used as the test 
mobile platform. This operating system 
provide rooting, which is necessary to access 
portions of internal storage that are protected 
by the operating system's security (Azhar & 
Barton, 2016). With this customised operating 
system the root access was granted natively 
Page 12 
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environments for forensics tools include 
scripting tools for the Linux operating system 
such as Bash, Perl and Python, as well as 
· 1 h "C" compiled programmmg anguages sue as . 
A forensic workstation running Kali, a 
distribution of Linux, with several forensics 
and cybersecurity tools was used, as listed in 
Table 3. 
Utilities 
ls: Listing 
dd: Data Dump 
mount: Mount command 
dmesg: System Logging 
file: File signature identification 
script: Terminal recording feature 
arp: Address Resolution Protocol 
telnet: Remote Access 
uname: Version Identification 
cp: Copy 
cat : Print file contents 
bash: Scripting environment 
without needing to install third-party rooting 
software, which is a forensically sound option 
when methods such as chip-off analysis are not 
available. Once the test platform was 
connected to the forensic workstation via USB, 
root terminal access was granted using 
Android Debug Bridge (ADB) (Android, 
2017). The "userdata" partition was identified 
by running the command "ls 
/ dev / block/ bootdevice / by-name" as shown in 
Figure 1. A forensic image of this partition was 
created using the "dd" command, as shown in 
Figure 2. This created an image on a 
removable microSD card attached to the test 
platform, which was copied to the forensic 
workstation for analysis. 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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1 r--wxr--wxr--wx root roo t 1970 -01- 02 11 :35 t= -> / dev / b1ock / mmcb1k0p6 
1 n"x r--wx rwx roo t root 1970 -01- 02 11 :35 t=Backup -> / dev/b1ock/mmcb1k0p l 3 
1 nNX r-v,ix 1-wx roo t root 1970-01-02 11 :35 userdata -> / dev/b1ock / mmcb1k0p42 
1 1-wx 1-wx 1-wx roo t roo t 1970-01-02 11 :35 utags -> / dev/b1ock / mmcb1k0p8 
1 r--wx r--wx r--wx roo t roo t 1970-01- 02 11 :35 utagsBac kup - > / dev/b1ock / mmcb1k0pl5 
root@osprey_umts: / de v/ block / bootdevi ce/by-name # • 
Figure 1. Sample listing of mounted partitions on Android platform. 
, oo t@ osp rey umt s : / dev/ b1ock/ boo tde vi ce/ by-narne # dd if=/ dev/ b1 ock/ rnrn cb1k0p42 of=/rnnt/sdca ,dl /rno t oro1a drone irnage.dd 
3685953+0 ,-ec O Ids rn - -
3685952+0 records out 
1887207424 bytes trans ferred in 705 .899 secs (2673480 bytes/sec) 
Figure 2. Forensic imaging of "mmcblk0p42" partition using "dd" command 
However, upon attempting to mount the 
image, the format was not recognised. 
Identifying this partition in the output of the 
"mount" command on the test platform 
revealed that the "userdata" partition is 
formatted in the Flash Friendly Filesystem, or 
"f2fs," which is designed specifically for flash 
storage devices (Lee et al., 2015). After 
checking compatible filesystems on the forensic 
workstation using the "cat / proc/ filesystems" 
command, it appeared that the "f2fs" file 
system was not supported by Kali. To 
overcome this , the "f2fs-tools" ( f2fs-tools) 
package for debian was installed. However, on 
attempting to mount the image again, the 
mount command returned errors, shown in the 
output of the "dmesg" command in Figure 3. 
: /111,·di.i/11111t/\Al1',lltli,/ll11iv,·1-.,ity/l1i-.,-.,,·1t.iti,,r1/A11.ily-.,i-.,/i111.iq,•-.,# dmesg I tail 
960 . 180197 ] devi ce -mapper: i oc tl: 4.33.0-ioctl (20 15-8- 18) initialised : dm-deve1@redhat.com 
960 .214816] l oop : module loaded 
1075 .651068 ] F2FS-fs (dm-0 ) : Magic 
1075 .651075] F2FS-fs (dm- 0) : Can 't 
1075 .65 1112] F2FS-fs (dm- 0) : Magic 
1075 .651115] F2FS-fs (dm-0 ) : Can 't 
1075.651119] F2FS-fs (dm- 0) : Magic 
1075 .65 1121] F2FS-fs (dm- 0) : Can 't 
1075 .65 1123] F2FS- fs (dm- 0) : Ma gi c 
1075.651125] F2FS- fs (dm-0) : Can 't 
Mi smat ch, va1id (0x f2f5201 0) -
find valid F2FS file sys tem in 
Mi smat ch, va1id (0x f2f52010) -
find valid F2FS filesys tem in 
Mi smat ch, va1id (0x f2f52010) -
find valid F2FS file sys tem in 
Mi s mat ch, va1id(0 xf2f52010) -
find valid F2FS file sys tem in 
Figure 3. Error messages from attempting to mount "userdata" forensic image 
read (0x0) 
1th s uperbl oc k 
read (0x0) 
2th superblock 
read (0x0) 
1th s uperbl oc k 
read (0x0) 
2th s uperblock 
At a glance, it seemed that the file system 
was corrupted, making the image unreadable. 
To fix this, the image would have to be 
modified. A copy of the image was made in 
order to maintain forensic soundness if 
modifications were later questioned in a court 
of law. Then, the tool "fsck.f2fs" from "f2fs-
tools," a version of the "fsck" tool designed to 
work with "f2fs" file systems, was used on the 
image. The "fsck" tool automatically scans for 
file system errors and corrects them. A portion 
of the output is seen in Figure 4. After this 
was completed, the image was successfully 
mounted on the forensic workstation and was 
ready for analysis, as seen in Figure 5. 
@ 2018 ADFSL Page 13
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11,,·-li.1 r 1 •,~1,-.,11r1,, 111,i,,1 it, - 11 1 "·11.11i .. 1, ~1111, ~ i-, 111,.,,1,•, # fsch..f2fs motoro1a_image_fina1.dd 
Info: Segments per section = l 
Info: Si::ic tions per- =one = l 
Info: s1:>ctor si=e = :,12 
Info: total sectors = 9535232 {4'JSS MB:, 
Info: MKFS v,:,rs1on 
"Linu, ver:,ion 3.1C.49-gf9e7acc ,:hud:,oncm@ilcl..bl.d109) {gee vl:?r-sion 4.8 (GCC) } #l SMP PREEMPT Mon Jan 4 07:50:33 ,:ST 2016" 
Info: FS 1:K ••<?r·<;.;ion 
frnm "L1nu, ver·sion 
to "Linu, vr::-r·sion 
16-01 13)" 
Info: superbloch. f,:,atur·'='s = l enc 1·,,pt 
(GCC) ) #1 SMP PREEMPT Mon Mo-,, 16 19 19 PST 201S" 
v•Hsion S.3.1 20160101 (D,::,bian 5.3.1-5) ) #1 SMP [ 1.::>bian 4.3.3-':;~a1i4 
Info: supe i-b 1 oc h. <?nc r·ypt 1. "::v,:,, 1 sa 1 t = 00000000(}30 1300000000000 13000013000 
Info: total. FS ·c-ector·s = 9:"i:l:",2~::· ,:4655 MB} 
Info: (KPT ".1<?r•sion = 4S41f 
ct10::-c~point stat.::- = ":, 
1 Sl :,:, 
o rpt,an~ inod.::>s 
nat "'nt ry 
1·9mov~ from orpt1an list 
Figure 4. Running "fsck.f2fs" tool on forensic image. 
• 1111111111il,~1-., # ls 1 .. ..,i+t 11111 11 .,, 1 1 , 1 ..,, ,u 111 t11111t-.,1 11" 
I !I q111-l 1I '1111• I I 1l 1t I 1 I J l t 11 I 
1 r lf 111 _ 1 1 1 • 1 1 , , 1111 , 1 1 , I I rnq I,, 11 t r 1 111 1 , l 1 1 r d 1 1 , 1 , v 1 " i 11" 111, , I 1 1 11,, , 1 "1 q I l t I ''1 q' 1 "I 1 1 r I I I 
' ' I I 1 ,ii 1111 ,11 1d r 111 r, .., .. ,11, , -, i !i, "" - r 1111- 1111q1-., 11-.,, r q ! I I I if I ' ''I 11 I! ' t I V l 1 f I I Ill I -., lf -., ! I Ill IJ I ' I 1 l j J ' it ' 
~ 1, 1, 1,.. 11 , I I I -. 1 1,.. 1 J 1 , Ir 111 1 , 1 I misc r I 
-
Figure 5. Successfully mounted forensic image. 
3.2 Drones 
As mentioned in Section 3, flight data such 
as GPS readings, altitude, speed, acceleration 
and battery levels were collected via various 
sensors present on the both the U AV systems. 
1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional: An 
operational diagram of DJI with potential 
DJI GO Application 
P,er:son Identifiable 
Information 
Flight Data Lo gs 
(GPS, Sp,eed., 
Batte1y Level) 
Capturn& Me<lia 
Serial N u.mher 
Acquisition method: 
Mo bite forensics 
I 
USB / 2.4GHz 
Wi-Fi 
<!), ,<!) 
00 
Flight Data (Temporal) 
Serial Number 
artefacts is shown in Figure 6. Following the 
methodology described in Section 3, a number 
of flights were conducted with the DJI 
Phantom, as listed in Table 4. This list is the 
practical log of flights taken on the day rather 
than data obtained from analysis of the UAV. 
DJI Phantom 3 Profossional UAV 
Controller Footprint 
Capture& Media 
Serial Number 
Pairing Information 
Acquisition method: acoess via 
network 
Acquisition method.: Imaging 
r,emovable media and internal s.torage 
Figure 6. DJI Phantom 3 Professional operation and potential artefacts 
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Once the flights had been performed, the 
DJI was taken back to a forensics lab for 
analysis . The primary method of data storage 
for the DJI Phantom is the removable micro 
SD card slot. During the test flight, a 16GB 
micro SD card was inserted, which was 
provided with the UAV itself. To analyse this 
media, the card was mounted to the forensic 
workstation and an image was created using 
the "dd" command. This is a forensically sound 
method of acquisition as the device does not 
need to be powered on. An initial check of the 
image using the Linux "file" command shows 
the card is formatted in the 32-bit File 
Allocation Table (F AT32) file system. 
The SD card's format is commonly found 
on many mass storage devices and it was 
analysed using various Linux utilities. The 
recorded media produced by the DJI stores 
some useful information, including GPS data, 
in the EXIF portion of the file. In order to 
interpret this data, the command line tool 
"exiftool" ( exiftool) was used. Data extracted 
from the UAV's mass storage devices were 
then correlated with artefacts extracted from 
the DJI GO mobile application, to highlight 
links between the controlling application and 
the UAV. The controller in this case does not 
seem to have any digital storage capacity of 
interest and was excluded from the scope of 
this investigation. 
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Another area of interest is the UAV's 
internal mounted storage. This is a micro SD 
card permanently attached to the main board 
of the UAV. To access this storage device, the 
U AV must be switched on and put into "Flight 
Data Mode" through the DJI GO application. 
The U AV was then connected to the forensic 
workstation via USB and the drive, named 
"DJI FLY LOG," was mounted. Analysis of the 
file system using "fsstat" showed the drive was 
formatted in FA T32, and a forensic image of 
the drive was acquired using the "dd" 
command. Upon examination, the drive 
contained a number of "FLYXXX.DAT" files , 
which were detailed flight logs, created by the 
DJI's internal operating system and stored in a 
proprietary format (Kovar et al., 2015). These 
files were copied to a removable storage device 
for further analysis. There are many online 
services offering interpretation of these files, 
however uploading evidence to a third-party 
server is not appropriate for a forensic 
investigation or intelligence purposes, so a tool 
designed to interpret and visualise these files, 
"CsvView" was downloaded and installed to a 
separate machine running Windows, connected 
to the internet. The tool was established with 
a Google Maps API key, allowing it to 
download imagery from the Google Maps 
database. 
Page 15
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Table 4. 
Fl' h d i_q. t recor . 
Flight Start Waypoints 
Time 
1 13:57 Travelled a short distance north 
of the Home Point before 
returning. 
2 14:05 Waypoint 1: 14:06 
Waypoint 2: 14:07 
Waypoint 3: 14:12 
Waypoint 4: 14:14 
3 14:17 Automatic Reconnaissance 
Flight 
Auto Land (Return to home) 
14:22 
4 14:34 (Same waypoints at Flight 2, 
time not recorded due to 
operator concentrating on flight) 
Manual Landing 
2) A.R Drone 2.0: An operational diagram 
of the A.R Drone 2.0 with potential artefacts is 
shown in Figure 7. A single flight, with the 
aim of collecting photos and media from the 
UAV and generating data on the A.R free 
flight application, was performed according to 
the procedure listed in section 3. Further flight 
was decided against due to safety concerns 
over wind levels. 
The structure of the A.R Drone 2.0's 
system results in three areas of interest for 
forensic artefacts, including the artefacts 
generated by the A.R Freeflight application 
and stored on the UAV's internal and 
removable storage. The application data was 
acquired using the methods described m 
section 3.1, and the removable storage media, 
a 512Mb flash drive formatted in the FAT32 
file system, was connected to the forensic 
workstation and a forensic image created using 
the "dd" command for later analysis. 
The A.R Drone 2.0 does not have any 
hardware ports allowing access to the internal 
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End Description, Notes and Recorded Media 
Time 
13:18 Test flight for compass calibration 
14:15 Manual flight , GPS assisted, 1 photo and 
one short video taken at each waypoint. 
14:22 Automatic Flight, GPS Assisted, Using 
DJI's built-in Point Of Interest (POI) 
function , which makes the drone rotate 
around a specified point. Video was 
recorded the entire flight. 
14:37 In this flight, foil was attached to the drone 
covering the GPS module. The drone was 
operated completely manually independent 
of GPS. This simulated the intentional 
obfuscation of GPS signals as mentioned in 
related work [15] [16]. 
storage, meaning the only method of access 
was through the UAV's Wi-Fi network. This 
method has been used by both digital forensics 
and cyber security researchers to acquire data 
and investigate the drone (Horsman, 2016). 
When switched on, the A.R becomes a Wi-Fi 
hotspot with the SSID "ardrone2," without any 
form of authentication. This has become a hot 
topic for security researchers and has even 
allowed for the development of automated 
drone hacking tools which target the weak 
security of drones such as the A.R (Pleban et 
al., 2014). Connecting to this network and 
interfacing with the UAV will invariably 
change digital data on the device. Therefore, 
all actions taken should be in accordance with 
the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) good practice guidelines for handling 
digital evidence (ACPO, 2012) principles 2; 
the person acquiring the data must be 
competent and give evidence for their actions, 
and 3; that an audit trail of processes should 
be created and preserved. The lack of other 
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routes into the A.R's internal memory is 
enough to fulfil principle 2 if actions taken are 
later questioned, and for principle 3, a 
A.R Frne,£1:ight Application 
P,erson Identifiable 
Information 
Flight Data Lo gs 
(Accelerometer, Batrei:y 
L-evd, Ultrasonic 
Altimeter) 
Captured Media 
Serial Number 
Acquisition method.: Mo bile 
forensics 
2 .4 GHz Wi-Fi 
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complete log will be kept using the Linux 
"script" tool , which records all terminal 
commands in a text file. 
A.R Drone 2-0 UA \ 
ControUer Footprint 
Captured Media 
Serial N um.her 
Acquisition method: Imaging rnmovabl,e 
media, access vianenvork 
Figure 7. A.R Drone 2.0 Power edition operation and potential artefacts 
. . . . . . ... 
@:ript star·ted on Sun 26 Mar· 2017 18:15:39 BST 
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# arp -a 
gateway (192.168.1.1) at 90:03:b7:92:53:38 [ether] on ·wlan0 
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# nmap 192.168.1.1 
Starting Nmap 7.12 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-03-26 18:15 BST 
mass_dns : warning: Unable to determine any DNS servers. Reverse DNS is disabled. Try using --system-dns or speci$ 
Nmap scan r·epo r·t for- 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 
Host is up (0.0094s latency) . 
Not shown : 997 closed ports 
PORT STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp open ftp 
23/tcp open telnet 
5555/tcp open freeciv 
MAC Address : 90:03:B7:92 :53:38 (Parrot) 
Nmap done : 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.67 seconds 
A[]0;root@lab: -/dronesAGA[[01;3lmroot@labA[[00m:A[[01;34m-/dronesA[[00m# telnet 192.168.1.1 
Trying 192 . 168 . 1.1 . .. 
Figure 8. Identification and connection to UAV 
Once connected to the A.R's access point, 
querying the forensic workstations ' Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) table using the 
command "arp - a" shows that the U AV has 
the local address "192.168.1.1." Running a port 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
scan against this address using the "nmap" 
(nmap) tool reveals three open ports, 21, 23 
and 5555. Service scans from the "nmap" tool 
showed they were File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP) and telnet ports respectively, with port 
Page 17
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5555 being erroneously identified as "freeciv," 
an online gaming protocol. Attempting to 
connect to the telnet port using an anonymous 
username gave instant root access to the 
UAV's underlying operating system. The log 
for this process is seen in Figure 8. 
Upon connection the telnet welcome 
message identified as running "busybox" 
version 1.14.0, a compiled set of binaries that 
provides a number of Linux utilities and is 
usually deployed on embedded devices where 
space is a premium. Running the "uname - r" 
command showed the U AV was running Linux 
version 2.6.32. , which was released in 2009 
(Kernel, 2009). The "mount" command showed 
two partitions of interest; 
"/ tmp/ udev/ dev/ sdal" was identified as being 
the removable storage media of the U AV, 
mounted using the Virtual FAT (VF AT) 
filesystem which provides backwards 
compatibility with FAT devices, and the 
"ubi2:data" partition formatted in the Unsorted 
Block Image file system (UBIFS). The use of 
UBIFS presents a challenge for forensic 
imaging because it is a "raw" file system that 
does not support logical block addressing in 
the same way that file system such as FAT 
and NTFS do. UBIFS uses the same flash 
hardware as other block devices, but without 
hardware logical block addressing, the 
partition could not be imaged directly using 
the "dd" tool as it is based on logical blocks. A 
possible solution to this problem involved 
compiling a UBIFS block interface on the 
U AV. After several failed cross-compilation 
efforts from the forensic workstation to the 
U AV, at attempt was made to compile the 
block interface on the UAV directly. However, 
the lack of a suitable build environment, 
including a package manager, configuration 
tools and even compiler in the U AV system 
meant that this option would require extensive 
changes to data within the U AV and was 
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discontinued in favour of logical level 
acquisition. This was performed by mounting a 
forensic mass storage device to the U AV and 
copying files from the mounted "/ data" 
partition using the "cp" command. 
4.RESULTS 
This section covers the key findings from the 
analysis described in Section 3. The results are 
broken down into three different areas of 
interest; the removable storage used by the 
U AV, the internal storage of the U AV and the 
results of the mobile forensic analysis on the 
DJI GO application in DJI Phantom 3 
Professional and A.R Freeflight application in 
A.R Drone 2. 
4.1 DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
1) SD Card: As described in section 3.1 , 
images acquired on DJI Phantom micro SD 
card was mounted to the forensic workstation 
and output from the "tree" command, shows 
two directories, DCIM and MISC as shown in 
Figure 9. The DCIM directory contains a 
wealth of .JPG, .DNG and .MP4 files, all of 
which are common media file formats. The file 
found under the LOG directory was a firmware 
upgrade log for the U AV. It refers to the file 
"P3S _FW _ v0l.10.0090.bin," located on the 
root of the SD card, meaning that file is the 
firmware update itself. Other useful 
information in this log includes a version 
history of the firmware, up to the current 
version. The THM directory appears to contain 
thumbnails generated from each flight. 
To analyse the EXIF Data of the stored 
media files, "exiftool" ( exiftool) was run against 
the DCIM/ lO0MEDIA directory. On initial 
inspection, GPS co-ordinates are stored under 
a "GPS Position" EXIF tag. To automate the 
process of extracting the GPS co-ordinates and 
create a timestamped GPS flight log, a simple 
script was created, as shown in Figure 10. 
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M.:ae 
idx 
:i.dx -
X I; a: s>38 __ _ 
• •_n._vo 
• r - or - , 1 f".i 1 
Figure 9. Output of tree command 
ex1ftoo1 ' -c "0o.6f 0o.6f 0o.6f" egrep 'GPS Positionl(reate Date' 
Figure 10. Script to retrieve GPS data from media EXIF information 
111111 111,1 I·,', i 111°1 ,11MI 111 A# -/drones/d j i/sc ript .sh 
Create Date 20 17 :04 :01 14 :07 : 30 
GPS Position 51. 000000 15 .000000 28 . 380300 N. 0 . 000000 36 . 000000 53 406800 
Create Date 2017:04 :01 14 :07 : 30 
GPS Posit ion 51 . 000000 15 .000000 28 . 380800 N. 0 . 000000 36. 000000 53 . 412300 
Create Date 20 17 :04 :01 14 :07 :46 
Trach. Create Date 2017:04:01 14 :07 :46 
Media Create Date 2017:04:01 14 :07 :46 
GPS Position 51 . 000000 15 .000000 28 . 378800 N. 0 . 000000 36 . 000000 53 39 1600 
Create Date 20 17 :04:0 1 14 :09 : 10 
GPS Position 51 . 000000 15 .000000 27 . 342900 ~I. 0 . 000000 36 000000 54 332000 
Create Date 2017:04:01 14 :09 : 10 
GPS Pos it ion 51 . 000000 15 .000000 27 . 347600 0 . 000000 36 . 000000 54 . 334400 
Figure 11. Sample of output from EXIF GPS extractor script 
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The script executed "exiftool" on all fi les in 
the directory, formatting the GPS data to 6 
decimal places. The output was then filtered to 
only contain the 'GPS Position' and 'Create 
Date,' which denotes when the picture or video 
was taken. The output of this script is shown 
in Figure 11. 
those flights 
"FLY012.DAT." 
were recorded in one file, 
using 
2) Internal Storage: The files extracted 
from the internal storage of the DJI Phantom 
were analysed using "CsvView" tool (Csv, 
2017). The DJI Phantom 3 operating system 
began recording flight data from the moment 
the U AV is switched on. This meant as flights 
1-3 listed in Table 4 were performed in the 
same session of drone activity, the data for 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
After processing 
"CsvView" tool, which converts the file from a 
.dat to a .csv format, the flights were 
visualised using the "GeoPlayer" function, 
which utilised the Google Maps API Key 
mentioned in section 3.2. A copy of this 
visualisation is shown in Figure 12, with each 
flight, waypoints 1-4 and point of interest 
(POI) highlighted. It is worth noting the 
supreme accuracy displayed by the automatic 
flight function in flight 3, in comparison to the 
other manual flights . The DJI Phantom was 
able to compensate for wind and other external 
Page 19
 JDFSL V13Nl 
factors flying at a constant altitude with 
minimal deviance from the set path. 
Because it is constantly recorded , the GPS 
data alone is not enough to distinguish 
between individual flights. The DJI Phantom 
flight recorder produces a host of other 
artefacts . Plotting these artefacts against each 
other using the "Csv View" tool provides a 
comprehensive understanding the actions taken 
by the drone. Figure 3.1.2.2 shows the flight 
Flight 3 
Flight 2 
Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools 
time (green), which remains constant under 
periods of non-activity, as well as the 
barometric altitude (blue) and the total 
voltage level of the battery (purple) of the 
UAV. When compared with each other, it can 
be deduced that there was three distinct 
periods of movement and altitude changes by 
the drone, were interpreted as flights. The 
possible artefacts recoverable from these logs 
are extremely detailed and are more than 
necessary to recreate a flight. 
Figure 12. Annotated visualisation of flights 1-3 
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Figure 13. Flight time, barometric altitude and total battery voltage plotted using CsvView. 
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Figure 14. Garbage GPS data from flight 4 
The file "FL Y014.DAT" file was identified 
as being the log for flight 4, listed in Table 4. 
The "GeoPlayer" visualisation for this flight 
showed that the GPS data recorded was 
mostly garbage data that had no relation to 
the actual flight , as shown in Figure 14. 
According to the Operator's previous 
experience, the recommended amount of GPS 
signals was about 11, but with the foil 
obstructing the unit, the DJI struggled to 
receive enough GPS data to successfully 
triangulate a position. To confirm this was the 
case, the flight time and "numSats" (number of 
satellites) readings from the flight logs were 
compared, and showed that during flight , the 
"numsats" reading was 0, as shown in the time 
period (X-Axis) of O to 370 in Figure 15. The 
foil was removed after the flight due to fears of 
overheating the drone through obstruction of 
the cooling vents. 
This confirms findings from related work 
(Maarse et al., 2016) that the GPS can be 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
obstructed simply by covering the module with 
aluminium foil. It is quite likely that in a crime 
scenario, this measure would be taken to 
prevent later forensic analysis of the flight 
path, or to evade no fly zones. In this case, 
investigators must instead rely on other data 
from the flight log. The DJI Phantom 3 
Professional is equipped with accelerometers, 
which record the acceleration in an axis 
relative to the UAV in metres/ second2 . Figure 
16 shows these readings when plotted against 
the flight data shown in the previous figure. 
These measurements can be used to 
reconstruct a flight in 3D space, relative to an 
arbitrary home point. While it would be 
possible to perform this analysis manually, the 
frequency of measurements taken by the 
Phantom make it unreasonable, and it would 
be better to develop a tool to do this 
automatically. 
Page 21 
  
 
JDFSL V13Nl Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools 
Figure 15. CPS health plotted against flight time for flight 4 
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Figure 16. Plotted accelerometer data for flight 
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3) DJI GO Application: Artefacts from the 
DJI GO application were located in different 
locations within the "userdata" partition of the 
android test platform, which was acquired 
using methods described in section 3.1. A list 
of these useful directories is shown in table 5. 
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Table 5 
List of useful directories from DJI GO Application 
P ath 
T ype of 
D escription 
Artefact 
/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG/ F light Data Contains a number of logs relating to drone activity CACHE 
/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG/ This is a log of activity relating to the DJI's built -in no 
CACHE/ NFZ 
F light Data fly zone function and contains information such as GPS 
location. 
/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji.pilot/ LOG/ Flight Data An error log from the U AV containing information on 
ERROR 
-
POP 
-
LOG satellite data not being available. 
A number of videos taken during flight named as a date 
/ media/ 0 / DJI/ dji. pilot / DJI _ in the format "YYYY MM DD hh mm ss" and - - - - -
RECORD Media stored with the "mp4" file extension. For each video file, 
t here is also a corresponding text file. This contains GPS 
data, manufacturing information and capture dates . 
F light Data, This directory contains flight data relating to a number 
Person of flights. A string search of these files revealed the 
/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji .pilot/ Flight Identifying presence of the "cccu phantom" string, which was the 
Record Information, name assigned to the UAV during setup. 
UAV Serial 
Number 
/ media/ 0/ DJI/ dji .pilot/ CAC Media Thumbnails of various images and videos taken during HE IMAGE flight, seemingly random. 
-
The flight record files extracted from the 
"FlightRecord" directory were analysed using 
the "CsvView" tool for comparison to the .DAT 
flight logs extracted from the Phantom's 
internal storage. Upon inspection, the files 
were confirmed to be flight data stored in a 
similar format to the .DAT files, but with 
notable differences. Firstly, the resolution of 
the recorded data is much lower, with the DJI 
GO application flight records being between 
l Kb and 1Mb, whereas the .DAT files from the 
U AV were much larger, often several hundred 
Megabytes. Secondly, files were recorded per 
flight from take-off to landing rather than per 
session of activity, meaning it was clearer when 
distinguishing between flights. The . txt files 
also had noticeably more metadata than the 
.DAT files - including serial numbers of the 
UAV and the DJI smart battery, application 
version information and the operating system 
of the test platform, as shown in Figure 17. 
@ 2018 ADFSL Page 23
  
 
JDFSL V13Nl Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools 
drone Type P3 Advanced 
dateTime 2017/04/0 1 12:59 :44.964 
a pp Version 3.1.4 
batterySN 1589 
. .. "' 032 1013321 
appType Android 
Figure 17. Metadata from DJI GO application flight log 
As well as this metadata, several other 
streams of flight data relating to use of the DJI 
GO application were available. The "flyCState" 
attribute described whether the Phantom was 
in manual or automatic mode. Figure18 shows 
the distance of the U AV from the home point 
plotted against the "flyCState" attribute during 
flight 3. The automatic POI function generated 
a clearly visible sine wave in the distance 
measurements during the time when the U AV 
was in automatic flight mode. This may be a 
useful artefact in identifying when the POI 
function has been used. 
While the GPS data for flight 4 was also 
destroyed by the foil covering the GPS 
receiver, it was also possible to extract the 
GPS location of the controlling application. 
This is a crucial finding as it allows for the 
location of the operator at the time of flight. 
Anti-forensics measures to counteract this may 
include GPS spoofing on a software level on 
the mobile platform, which is possible with free 
applications available on app markets such as 
google play. 
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Figure 18. UAV Flight state plotted against distance from home point for flight 3 
4.2 A. R Drone 2.0 
1) Internal Storage: The mass storage device 
was mounted to the forensic workstation for 
examination of the files acquired from the 
Page 24 
U AV. A number of files of interest were 
located, as listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
List o.f files acquired from A. R Drone 2. 0 Internal Storage 
Path Type Description 
System log, containing det ails of Version information, configuration 
/ dat a/ syslog. bin various software and hardware dat a , mount information, file creation 
events from the UAV's internal logs 
operating system. 
/ dat a/ config.ini Configuration file for the UA V. Drone serial number, software version, drone name, access point SSID 
Unidentified binary file. Further n/ a 
/ dat a/ emergency. bin work should identify the importance of this file and it's 
cybersecurity implications. 
Directory containing several files GPS dat a. The UAV does not have a 
/ dat a/ custom.configs / sessions/ named "config.xxxxxxxx.ini" G PS sensor installed so it likely 
originated from the A.R Freeflight 
application. 
Directory containing a file named Contains a footprint from the 
"config.xxxxxxxx.ini ." 
/ dat a/ custom.configs / profiles/ 
The amount of data present in the system 
log located at "/ dat a/ syslog.bin" meant scripts 
were used to analyse threads of output. For 
example, the A.R drone's operating system 
uses a set of processes to access the external 
storage with the prefix "UsbKey," including 
"UsbKeyMonitor," "UsbKeyWriter" and 
"UsbKeyRepairer." The logs from these 
methods were retrieved using the command 
controlling application with name of 
t he mobile platform, 
"Mororola MotoG3" and a serial 
-
number - "PS721003AJ4K103341." 
"cat syslog.bin I grep UsbKey" and then further 
filtered. "UsbKeyMonitor" prints the serial 
number when a new USB device is attached , so 
filtering using the word "Serial" produced a 
history of all the USB keys attached to the 
UAV, as shown m Figure 19. Other 
information such as the vendor and product ID 
was also available through this method. 
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Figure 19. USB serial number history of UAV 
Filtering the system log for all 
"UsbKeyWriter" outputs gave a history of all 
files created on the removable storage, with 
system times in the Linux log epoch format of 
seconds. Filtering for the "Video" outputs gives 
a log of the use of both the UAV's internal 
cameras, which video codec is being used and 
other details including resolution. Examination 
of the "syslog. bin" file give a comprehensive 
overview of actions carried out by the UAV's 
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operating system. Values found also reflected 
values in the "config.ini" files examined in 
Table 6. Future work should identify whether 
modification of the "config.ini" files would 
change data in the system log, for anti-
forensics purposes. 
Drone Forensic Analysis Using Open Source Tools 
2) Removable Storage: Based on artefacts 
from the system logs, the removable storage 
media only serves the purpose of storing media 
files captured from the UAV. A list of all files 
in the partition using the "tree" command 
confirms this to be the case. 
11 de 
7~ ~-~-~--~-~--~-~-~--~-~ 
"albtw e.cw + 
e 
6,2 
6 .__ ...... ____________ ....._ _______ _, 
D 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 
me 
Figure 20. Altitude measurements for the duration of the extracted video file 
All the files were videos, stored with the 
"mp4" file extension. Photos were taken during 
the flight; however, none were present on any 
of the UAV's storage media. This is likely due 
to the photos being stored on the mobile 
device, and videos being too large to transmit 
over the network. Examination of the video 
files using "exiftool" revealed a number of 
artefacts, including creation time, the device 
name "Parrot AR.Drone." The 
"ARDroneTelemetry" tag was extracted from 
one of the videos using the "-b" option. This 
appeared as a set of floating point numbers 
and integers, with no labels or column headers. 
Using heuristics based on knowledge of the 
phantom system and known flight data, it was 
deduced that the first of the floating points 
was a timestamp, as it increased in regular 
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increments. Also deduced was that the last 
floating point was the altitude of the UAV 
during flight, as the values steadily changed, 
and matched the approximate value of the 
flight. The telemetry data was dumped to a 
file for analysis with the command "exiftool - b 
- ARDroneTelemetry 
media20170401 _ 150213 / vide 
o _ 20170401 _ 150249.mp4> - / drones/ parrot / gn 
uplot / telemetry." A basic script was created to 
convert the data to a comma-separated value 
file , which could then be visualised using the 
"gnuplot" tool for Linux (gnuplot , 2017). The 
altitude was plotted over the period of the 
whole video, as shown in Figure 20. Further 
work should be carried out to confirm these 
hypotheses regarding the telemetry data for 
the A.R Drone 2.0. 
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3) A.R Freeflight Application: The 
"userdata/ data/ com. parrot.freeflight" 
directory contained several ."xml" files, with 
names in the format of "< MAC Address of 
mobile platform> < Timestamp> ." These 
appear to correlate with sessions of activity on 
the UAV. Each file contains a number of flight 
and application session records, with each 
XML ( eXtendable Markup Language) block 
being named accordingly. The 
"FLIGHT_DRONE_SERIAL" tag displays a 
matching serial number to the one listed in 
section 2, meaning these artefacts both exist on 
the UAV and the mobile platform and can be 
used to connect the two during an 
investigation. Another XML file, located in 
"userdata/ com. parrot .freeflight / shared 
_prefs/ Preferences.xml" held a number of 
important artefacts, including the GPS co-
ordinates of the last flight, the email address of 
the google account used to download the 
application, and when the application was last 
opened. This is the first artefact found that 
directly links the use of a drone to a user 
account, which can later be used to trace a 
user. 
The A.R Freeflight application has a media 
storage location m the platform's 
"userdata/ media/ 0/ DCIM" (Digital Camera 
!Mage) directory, which contains all the media 
captured by the UAV's cameras. EXIF data 
for these files varies, some containing GPS 
information which matches the operator 
location during the flight, and some only 
containing a few details such as the creation 
date - it is unclear whether this is due to file 
corruption. Again, all GPS readings most likely 
originated from the mobile platform as the 
UAV does not natively possess a GPS 
capability. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Two multi-platform UAV systems - the DJI 
Phantom 3 Professional and Parrot A.R Drone 
@ 2018 ADFSL 
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2.0 Power edition, have been investigated in 
this paper. Although, there is operational 
difference between the drones, a number of 
common methods were utilised to recover data 
from drones and controlling devices using open 
source tools. In comparison to the A.R, the 
DJI phantom was found to have an 
extraordinarily large number of artefacts 
associated with it, because having more sensors 
and a higher resolution of data capture, which 
comes from its status as a professional device. 
In both cases, it was necessary to interpret 
flight data collected by the U AV s. At its most 
simple, this involved interpreting the 
movements of the U AV s in three-dimensional 
space. This was simpler with the DJI as it 
records GPS automatically and work had 
already been done in that area to develop a 
tool for easy interpretation of the flight data. 
Most of the potential artefacts listed in Section 
3 were found on the U AV s or their controlling 
systems, and were successfully extracted to 
identify a suspect, recreate a flight and capture 
media from the devices. Some anti-forensics 
methods were also successfully tested. Future 
work should look at the automation of drone 
forensics, and explore methods discussed in 
this paper to other drone models such as DJI 
Phantom 4 Pro, DJI Mavic Pro or Parrot 
Bebop and different mobile platforms such as 
Windows and iOS and especially, integration 
of the methods discussed here into commercial 
forensic tool-kits. 
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